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African states are reclaiming a greater role in natural resource  extraction
that is generating significant scholarly interest and debate. This paper
contributes to the debate by considering how these measures fit into the
developmental state paradigm first used to study East Asian countries following
World War II, and the “new” development state framework that currently
dominates law and development scholarship. This paper argues that recent
policy reforms by African states – including enhanced local participation,
increased linkages between extractive industries and other sectors, and broader
resource nationalist measures that seek to generate more revenue for national
governments – are characteristic of the developmental state and “new”
developmental state, neither have fully taken shape in resource-rich Africa as
it is unclear how these new measures address “good governance” and
democracy concerns.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
There is a burgeoning scholarly debate1 surrounding recent developments in
African extractive regimes, particularly as states move to reclaim greater
benefits from natural resources.2 This paper intends to contribute to the debate
*  Ph.D. Student, Osgoode Hall Law School at York University, Toronto, Canada.
1 Hany Besada and Philip Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a “Fourth”
Generation?” (2015) 28:2 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 263, 263.
2 The natural resources discussed here are limited to non-renewable natural
resources (oil, gas, metals, and minerals) that are mined or removed from
nature to produce raw materials. The term “resource-rich” is used to refer to
any state engaged in the extraction of natural resources, regardless of the
percentage of revenue the industry contributes to the national budget. This
definition is intended to be broader than that used by the International Monetary
2 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 1: 2016
Fund which restricts the description of “resource-rich” to countries where natural
resource revenues contribute to at least 20 per cent of the national budget
(International Monetary Fund, “Sub-Saharan Africa – Sustaining Growth amid
Global Uncertainty” (World Economic and Financial Surveys, 2012)
<www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/afr/eng/sreo0412.pdf> accessed
23 October 2015.
3 Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial
Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford University Press 1982).
4 Esteban Pérez Caldentey, “The Concept and Evolution of the Developmental
State” (2008) 37 International Journal of Political Economy, 27, 28.
5 Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba (eds), The Developmental State in Africa:
Problems and Prospects (Institute for Development and Peace INEF-Report, 101/
2010).
6 “Law and the New Developmental State (LANDS)” <https://law.wisc.edu/gls/
lands.html> accessed 25 November 2015.
7 Botswana’s characterisation as a developmental state will not be discussed in
this paper. It has previously been examined in Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor
(eds.), The Potentiality of Developmental States in Africa: Botswana and Uganda
Compared (Dakar: CODESIRA, 2005); Peter Meyns and Charity Musamba (eds),
The Developmental State in Africa: Problems and Prospects (Institute for
Development and Peace INEF-Report, 101/2010); and Sara Ghebremusse,
 Conceptualising the Developmental State in Resource-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa”
(2015) 8:2 Law and Development Review 467.
by considering how these measures are characteristic of a “developmental
state”. Originally developed by Chalmers Johnson to describe the policies of
Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI),3 the developmental
state is one “that intervenes and guides the direction”4 of economic growth. In
the context of African resource extraction, the developmental state debate
has focused on whether new policies and institutions aimed at garnering
greater benefits for the state are akin to not simply guiding economic growth,
but more specifically if they are driving development objectives.5
The African developmental state debate has occurred in areas of study
such as Political Economy, Development Studies, and African Studies; thus
far, it has been largely absent from Law and Development (L&D) scholarship.
The developmental state was embraced as an analytical framework by leading
L&D scholars David Trubek, Alvaro Santos, and Diogo Coutinho, to the point
where the concept was reframed as the “new” developmental state to describe
recent policies of the Brazilian government.6 Orienting myself in L&D
scholarship, I examine in this paper how recent regulatory reforms by African
states fit into the developmental state paradigm, and the “new” developmental
state framework that dominates L&D. While several characteristics are present,
this paper argues that neither the developmental state, nor the “new”
developmental state, have fully taken shape in resource-rich Africa, with the
possible exception of Botswana.7 However, recent policies undertaken by
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8 Bonnie Campbell, for example, identified three distinct periods of African mining
codes (Bonnie Campbell, “Factoring in Governance is Not Enough. Mining Codes
in Africa, Policy Reform and Corporate Responsibility” (2003) 18:3 Minerals
and Energy 2). Alternatively, Chris Roberts in “The Other Resource Curse:
Extractives as Development Panacea” (2015). Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, 28:2: 283 offered five distinct periods of extractive industry regulatory
evolution across sub-Saharan Africa in the time since independence.
9 Economic Commission for Africa and the African Union, Minerals and Africa’s
Development: The International Study Group Report on Africa’s Mineral Regimes
(United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2011) 12.
several African states are substantial steps in the direction of an African
resource-rich developmental state, with a noticeable concern – the “good
governance” and democracy deficit – still needing to be addressed.
To examine these issues, I have divided this paper as follows: Section 2
discusses the history of African resource extraction to explain the varied roles
of the African state in resource extraction. The developmental state and “new”
developmental state are described in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper
with an examination of the policy directives that comprise the “new directions
in African developmentalism” and are contributing to the emerging resource-
rich developmental state across the continent.
2.  GENERATIONS OF AFRICAN
RESOURCE EXTRACTION
Natural resource extraction in sub-Saharan Africa underwent a series of
significant changes that altered state involvement in the sector since the
independence era.8 The section below covers four distinct periods of African
resource extraction: colonialism; the early post-colonial period; the rise of
neo-liberalism; and the retreat from neo-liberalism. In the colonial era, natural
resource sectors were an export enclave. Following independence, natural
resource extraction was dominated by the thrust of resource nationalism.
Soon after, the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s pushed the
African state out of the sector. In recent years, there has been a marked return
to resource nationalism and a retreat from several neo-liberal policies. The
generations of African extractives history from colonialism to the retreat
from neo-liberalism are discussed below to provide the context for current
interventions in the sectors, which are discussed further in Section 4.
2.1 Colonialism
Europe’s colonisation and scramble for Africa was largely driven by
competition among states to locate and gain control of mineral resources.9







16 Ann Seidman, Robert Seidman, Pumzo Mbana, and Hanson Hu Li, “Introduction”,
in Ann Seidman, Robert Seidman, Pumzo Mbana, and Hanson Hu Li (eds.),
Africa’s Challenge: Using Law for Good Governance and Development (Africa World
Press Inc 2007) 6.
These exploitative efforts of colonial governments created dominant extractive
industries across much of sub-Saharan Africa: gold production in the former
Gold Coast (Ghana); copper in Northern Rhodesia (modern-day Zambia)
and Belgian Congo (the Democratic Republic of Congo); and diamonds in
South Africa, Sierra Leone, the Congo and the Gold Coast.10 By the early part
of the twentieth century, natural resources accounted for more than 40 per
cent of the exports from five colonies: the Belgian Congo; the Gold Coast;
Northern Rhodesia; Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); and South Africa.11 Not
far behind were Angola, Sierra Leone, and South-West Africa (Namibia),
where natural resources made up a significant part of these colonies’ exports.12
The expansion of colonialism across Africa entrenched extractive colonial
institutions, and led to the creation of enclave extractive sectors. Since natural
resource extraction was an economic priority for the colonial state, necessary
measures were introduced to ensure that the primacy of the sector remained
intact.13 This included introducing and implementing political safeguards,
legal protections, infrastructure financing, and securing much needed labour
from the local population.14
Across the continent, colonial regimes reinforced the export-oriented nature
of extractive industries by extinguishing local mining practices, diverting
African labour to resource extraction, and directing investment to
infrastructure necessary to move minerals from the interior to coastal areas
for shipment outside the region.15
2.2 Early Post-Colonial Period
When colonial rule came to an end beginning in the late 1950s and well into
the 1960s, African states inherited enclave extractive institutions that were ill
equipped to respond to the immediate developmental needs of the newly
independent states.16 The 2011 report prepared by the International Study
Group for the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the African
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17 UNECA/AU (n 9) 14.
18 Evaristus Oshionebo, “Fiscal Regimes for Natural Resource Extraction:
Implications for Africa’s Development” in Francis Botchway (ed), Natural Resource
Investment and Africa’s Development (Edward Elgar Publishing 2011) 200.
19 UNECA/AU (n 9) 14.
Union lists six key features of the “externally-oriented enclave” industries
inherited by African states:
i. Ownership and operation of the mines were in the hands of foreign
companies;
ii. Mining operations had very weak links with the rest of the economy,
because most of the minerals were exported in raw form or after
only basic processing;
iii. Firms imported most of their inputs and repatriated all their profits,
except what was reinvested in mining operations;
iv. Export trade figures were dominated by mineral exports, but this
painted a false picture of how much the country was benefiting
from minerals given the import dependence of the mines, the free
repatriation of profits, technical fees charged and the incomes of
expatriate employees;
v. Mining was a substantial, often the biggest, source of public revenue;
and
vi. The most important skills involved in running the mines came from
expatriate employees [due] to the racist division of labour under
colonialism that kept Africans in low-skill, low-wage jobs.17
A key legislative measure enacted by several African states upon
independence to reverse the enclave orientation of extractive industries was
the introduction of national ownership of natural resources. Often this took
the form of a constitutional clause, as was the case in Nigeria and Ghana.18
Along with vesting natural resource wealth in the state, African governments
undertook a number of different policies aimed at further enhancing the
benefits of resource extraction. These included the creation of state-owned
extractive enterprises to explore mineral and oil deposits, establish production,
and securing interest in already existing extractive operations.19
In the decades after independence, the efforts of African states yielded
mixed results, as the potential of resource extraction was not fully realised
across the continent. This sentiment was acknowledged in the Lagos Plan of
Action, adopted in 1980 by the predecessor to the African Union, the
Organisation of African Unity. Under the mandate of conducting a “strategic
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20 UNECA/AU (n 9) 5.
21 ibid.
22  ibid.
23 Bonnie Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process of African Mining Regimes”
(2010) 30:1-2 Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 197, 200.
24 Hany Besada & Philip Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a Fourth
Generation?” (The North South Institute, May 2013) <www.nsi-ins.ca/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/Mining-Codes-in-Africa-Report-Hany.pdf> accessed
27 October 2015.
review of Africa’s development challenges and potential paths for economic
growth and development”,20 the Plan identified “the major problems
confronting Africa in the field of natural resource development”:21
Lack of information on natural resource endowment of large and
unexplored areas…; lack of adequate capacity (capital, skills and
technology) for the development of these resources; a considerable
dependence on foreign transnational corporations for the
development of a narrow range of African natural resources selected
by these corporations to supply [the] raw material needs of the
developed countries; the inadequate share in the value added
generated by the exploitation of natural resources of member
States…; non-integration of the raw materials exporting industries
into the national economies of the member States thus impeding
backward and forward linkages; the extremely low level of
development and utilisation of those natural resources of no interest
to foreign transnational corporations; and the disappointingly low
general contribution of natural resources endowment to socio-
economic development.22
The acknowledgement of Africa’s poor performance in resource extraction
was not only clear to African states; it soon garnered the attention of
international financial institutions (IFIs), most notably the World Bank, which
soon enforced policies aimed at “correcting” the problems of Africa’s extractive
sectors.23
2.3 The Rise of Neo-Liberalism
At the height of African national ownership in the extractive sector,
approximately 41.5 per cent of natural resource production was under state
control, while another 40.5 per cent was controlled through public-private
joint ventures.24 Yet, as African states entrenched themselves in their extractive
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27 Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action (The World
Bank, 1981).
28 Besada and Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa” (2013) (n 24) 8.
29 ibid.
30 Campbell, “Revisiting” (n 23) 200.
31 ibid.
32 ibid 201.
33 UNECA/AU (n 9) 17.
34 Campbell, “Revisiting the Reform Process” (n 23) 201.
sectors, the region received only 4 per cent of global investment in natural
resource exploitation by the late 1980s.25 This inability to capitalise on natural
resource wealth was attributed to the mismanagement of extractive sectors,
coupled with poor governance that led to the deterioration of economic
institutions in many African states.26
The response of IFIs to this failure to capitalise on natural resource wealth
production was to push for de-nationalisation and to demand privatisation in
the extractive sector.27 Beginning in the late 1980s, the extractive sectors in
Africa underwent significant reform as both the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed for the wholesale privatisation of the sectors
and a redefinition of the role of the state in those industries.28 Using the
mechanisms of conditionality, the IFIs were able to oversee the implementation
of these reforms as African states sought financing during the 1980s debt
crisis.29
The structural transformation of African extractive sectors culminated in
the World Bank’s 1992 report entitled, Strategy for African Mining.30 On the
heels of African governments’ failed attempts to get actively involved in
extractive enterprises, and thus promote the sector’s growth and development,
the World Bank argued that African states should take a backseat and allow
foreign investors to develop the potential of extractive industries in the region.31
This was deemed the best way to move the sectors forward, and provide long-
term benefits (mainly through taxation) for national governments.32 The report
identified key reforms: reduced or eliminated state participation in extractive
enterprises; introducing a wide range of incentives to boost foreign investment;
implementing more competitive tax regimes; liberalised exchange controls
and exchange rate policy; and greater investment-protection measures,
including stabilisation clauses in mining contracts to ensure greater security
for investors.33 According to Bonnie Campbell, the report, at its core, argued,
“that to adapt to modern conditions of mining, the primary objective of African
countries should be to avoid state ownership and attract private investors.”34
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35 UNECA/AU (n 9) 17.
36 ibid.
37 ibid.
38 Besada and Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa” (2013) (n 24) 4.
39 IMF (n 2).
40 Besada and Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa” (2013) (n 24) 4.
41 UNECA/AU (n 9) 19.
42 Antonio Pedro, “The Africa Mining Vision: Towards Shared Benefits and Economic
Transformation” (2012) 1:5 Great Insights Magazine <http://ecdpm.org/great-
insights/extractive-sector-for-development/the-africa-mining-vision-towards-
shared-benefits-and-economic-transformation/> accessed 3 November 2015.
In the years following the implementation of these reforms, the results
were optimistically described as “mixed at best”.35 Although the reforms did
promote levels of foreign investment by creating a more favourable investment
environment, they failed to achieve the promised advancements in socio-
economic development goals.36 A 2007 “Policy Big Table” – comprising officials
from African governments, the African Union, the African Development Bank,
the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, and members of
international organisations – concluded that “African efforts to attract [foreign
investment] to their natural resources sector, which led to the formulation of
overly generous investment laws and regulations”,37 failed to generate benefits
from the exploitation of natural resources.
2.4 The Retreat from Neo-Liberalism
The failure of neo-liberal policies to advance socio-economic development
catalysed African states to take broader action in their extractive sectors.38
Motivated by the importance of natural resource wealth to revenue generation
(particularly for the African states fiscally dependent on revenues derived
from resource extraction),39 African governments are creating greater policy
space and inserting themselves more in their extractive sectors.40
Recognising the importance of resource extraction to the socio-economic
development, African states gathered under the auspices of the African Union
and concluded the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) in 2009.41 The Vision intends
to promote “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral
resources to underpin broad-based sustainable growth and socio-economic
development.”42 In his article discussing the AMV, Antonio Pedro (the Director
of UNECA’s Sub-regional Office for Eastern Africa) described the following
four “principal opportunities” for the implementation of the AMV:
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Developmental State in Resource-Rich Sub-Saharan Africa” (2015) 8:2 Law
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46 Caldentey (n 4) 28.
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1. To optimise the capture, management, sharing and use of resource
rents to improve physical, social and human capital and
infrastructure…
2. The collateral use of the high-rent resource infrastructure to open
up other resource potential in areas such as agriculture, forestry
and tourism, and to provide access to zones of economic potential
with lower returns, but that cannot afford their own infrastructure.
3. To promote downstream value addition, through the use of the
locational advantage of producing crude resources, with a view to
establishing resource-processing industries…
4. To promote upstream value-addition through the use of relatively
large resources sector market to develop the resource supply and
inputs sector…43
Seen as an attempt to correct the failed neo-liberal policies of the IFIs,
the AMV actively rejects African states merely acting as passive regulators of
extractive industries and encourages a turn towards the “developmental state”.44
3.  THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE45
At its core, the “developmental state” is committed to economic development.
It is generally characterised as “a state that intervenes and guides the
direction”46
 
 of economic growth. Chalmers Johnson’s 1982 study of Japan
and its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was the first to
profile the characteristics of this state model. In his landmark study, MITI and
the Japanese Miracle,47
 
Johnson identified four key components of the
developmental state: a small, efficient bureaucracy; a political environment
that allows the bureaucracy to operate independently and free of intrusive
interests; state intervention in the economy; and pilot institutions, such as the
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48 Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor, “Botswana and Uganda as Developmental States(?)”
in Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor (eds), The Potentiality of ‘Developmental States’ in
Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (CODESIRA 2005) 4.
49 See for example Joseph Stiglitz, Globalisation and Its Discontents (WW Norton &
Co. 2002) and Dani Rodrik, ‘After Neo-liberalism, What?’ (Harvard University,
August 2002), <www.bndespar.com.br/SiteBNDES/export/sites/default/
bndes_pt/Galerias/Arquivos/conhecimento/seminario/novosrumos_Dani.pdf>
accessed 14 December 2014.
50 Karl Botchway and Jamee Moudud, “The Search for a New Developmental State”
(2008) 37:3 International Journal of Political Economy 5, 6.
51 David M Trubek, “Law, State, and the New Developmentalism: An Introduction”
in David M Trubek, Helena Alvair Garcia, Diogo R Coutinho, and Alvaro Santos
(eds), Law and the New Developmental State: The Brazilian Experience in Latin




 Although state intervention was common among both industrialised
and developing economies in the decades following World War II, the
developmental state offered a way to characterise governments that went
beyond intervention alone and used it as a tool to advance economic growth.
After dominating economic policymaking in the mid-twentieth century,
active state intervention faced opposition as neo-liberal economic policies
gained popularity in the 1980s. The rise of neo-liberalism coincided with the
decline of the developmental state, as neo-liberals argued it was not equipped
to handle the economic crises that arose in the late 1970s and early 1980s. As
a result, the role of the state in development receded in the face of neo-liberal
policies that favoured deregulation, free trade, and privatisation. Today, after
years of what many scholars agree was a failure of neo-liberal policies to
promote development49
 
 several developing countries are channelling the
principles of the developmental state model proposed by Johnson. According
to Karl Botchway and Jamee Moudud, the mediocre record of neo-liberalism
has revived support for state intervention and refocused attention on the role
of the state in development.50
 
 David Trubek describes this modern
developmental state as the “new developmental state”.51
3.1 The “New Developmental State” and the Evolution of
Law and the Developmental State
Alongside the evolution of developmental state theory in political science,
economics, and international political economy was its critical alignment
with L&D scholarship. As a field of study, L&D consistently shifted due to its
intersections with “law, economics, and the practices of states and development
agencies”.52 The first major iteration of L&D scholarship emerged in the
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1960s among American legal scholars as “the law and development
movement.”53
 
 Influenced by the modernisation theory of WW Rostow, which
contended that development occurred in a period of successive phases of
economic growth, these scholars advocated that the adoption of Western legal
traditions could foster Third World modernisation.54
 
 Consequently, this
movement supported a “top-down” approach that consisted of reforming the
legal profession to train lawyers to use law as a means of achieving the
developmental goals of the state.55
 
L&D’s encounter with the developmental state historically covers two
distinct time periods. The first can be described as “law of the developmental
state”.56
 
 During this period, law was used as a tool of the developmental
state, specifically directed to making state intervention more effective. This
approach was used mostly in the 1960s and early 1970s, when development
economists favoured the state guiding industrial growth over the private
sector.57
 
 Private sector actors were considered less equipped to manage the
demands of industrial expansion; thus states were regarded as better suited
to carrying out development.58
 
 The second period emerged in the 1980s
after doubts were raised about the developmental state’s effectiveness.
With the shift towards more neo-liberal economic policies advanced by
IFIs, “law in the neo-liberal market”59
 
 became the second encounter between
law and the developmental state. Law’s role in the economy morphed during
this period from a tool to advance development goals, to a shield used to
protect the market against unwanted state intervention.60
 
 The role of the
state was limited to using law as a means to protect investor expectations
and facilitate private business transactions.61
 
 Since the late 1990s, however,
IFIs have rejected the neo-liberal “night watchman” concept of the state and
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62 Kerry Rittich, “The Future of Law and Development: Second-Generation Reforms
and the Incorporation of the Social” in David Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds),
The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal (Cambridge
University Press 2006), 212.




67 David M Trubek, “Developmental States and the Legal Order: Towards a New
Political Economy of Development and Law” (2008) University of Wisconsin
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1075, 11.
accepted that various market distortions and failures may require intervention
and direct corrective action.62
Today, there is no prevailing theory that is shaping the relationship between
law and the developmental state. David Trubek suggests that “the consensus
on which the neo-liberal model was built is crumbling,”63
 
while new
conceptions are emerging from state practices and development scholarship.
The absence of a theoretical consensus on the role of law in the developmental
state has led to what Trubek calls the “new developmental state.”64 In the
midst of the current theoretical vacuum, different ideas about the
developmental state are emerging that rely on “different models of development
and different roles for law”.65
 
An overarching feature of this new developmental state is the revised
relationship between the state and the private sector. No longer is the state acting
as the sole guiding hand of the economy; neither is the private sector seeking to
act unilaterally with little involvement from the state. Instead, new
developmentalism acknowledges that optimal development goals will be realised
if the state and the private sector collaborate. New developmentalists posit that
this can include public-private partnerships, and other joint efforts that originate
from state promotion of industrial innovation and competitiveness.66
 
 Policies
that may characterise this new developmental state include:
• Primary reliance on the private sector as investor rather than direct
state ownership [with natural resource sectors being a possible
exception];
• Acceptance of a major role for the state in steering investment,
coordinating projects and providing information;
• Promotion of productive (rather than speculative) foreign direct
investments; [and]
• Emphasis on making private firms competitive rather than on
shielding them from competition.67 
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Whether the “new developmental state” exists in Africa has not been
thoroughly explored in either the developmental state literature or in L&D
scholarship. Following the historical overview of the developmental state in
Africa in Section 3.2, I will examine how recent reforms in African extractive
sectors mirror the “new developmental state” (as characterised by Trubek) in
Section 4.
3.2 An Overview of the Developmental State in Africa
In most instances, the scholarship concerning African developmental states
centres on the question of whether the model is even possible. Referred to as
“impossibility theorems”, some Africanist developmental state scholarship
attempts to debunk these theses.68
 
They contend the arguments are not based
on the reality of Africa’s historical, political, or economic climate: the
developmental state existed in many parts of Africa, and still can today. This
section discusses the history of the African state in development, and examines
the replicability and rationale for the developmental state in Africa.
3.3 History of the African State in Development
Like Japan, African governments became dominant players in socio-economic
development after the end of a tumultuous period in history. The end of
colonialism and new-found independence thrusted African governments into
the centre of their states’ development trajectories. Post-colonial leaders of
Africa’s newly independent states inherited the task of pursuing social and
economic development from colonial predecessors that had practically ignored
the task entirely. As heads of nationalist parties that dominated the post-
colonial one-party state system, these leaders and their parties quickly became
synonymous with the state as agents of development.69
 
 Kwame Nkrumah in
Ghana, Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, and Kenneth Kuanda in Zambia are a few
examples.70
 
 At independence these leaders were faced with a weak, almost
non-existent private sector, which led many states to assume the role of the
68 Thandika Mkandawire, “Thinking about Developmental States in Africa” (2001)
25 Cambridge Journal of Economics 292, 309-310.
69 Karl Botchway and Jamee Moudud, “Neo-liberalism and the Developmental
State: Consideration for the New Partnership for Africas Development” in
Benjamin F Bobo and Hermann Sintim-Aboagye (eds), Neo-liberalism,
Interventionism and the Developmental State: Implementing the New Partnership
for Africa’s Development (Africa World Press Inc 2012) 16.
70 ibid.
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71 Meyns and Musamba (n 5) 28.
72 Mkandawire, “Thinking” (n 68) 291.
73 Meyns and Musamba (n 5) 29.
74 Claude Ake, Democracy and Development in Africa (Brookings Institution 1996)
6.
75 ibid; Meyns and Musamba (n 5) 29.
76 Howard Stein, “Rethinking African Development” in Ha-Joon Chang (ed),
Rethinking Development Economics (Anthem Press 2003) 159.
77 Francis B Nyamnjoh and Ignasio M Jimu, “Success or Failure of Developmental
States in Africa: Exploration of the Development Experiences in a Global Context”
in Pamela Mbabazi and Ian Taylor (eds), The Potentiality of Developmental States
in Africa: Botswana and Uganda Compared (CODESIRA 2005) 27.
78 Mkandawire, “Thinking” (n 68) 292.
79 ibid.
main economic actor. This responsibility extended from constructing social
and economic infrastructure, to owning and managing productive
industries.71
 
For some scholars, the centrality of development to this group of post-
colonial leaders is sufficient to describe these states as developmentalist.72
For others, these leaders’ records raise serious doubts about early post-colonial
developmentalism in Africa.73
 
 Although development was a priority for
several leaders, some scholars argue that consolidating power was another
objective that detracted from developmentalism. Claude Ake, for example,
contends that state intervention was not used to promote development, but
rather “to facilitate the appropriation of wealth by means of state power.”74
 
The early development failures across sub-Saharan Africa – particularly in
Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Zaire – are used to support this view.75
 
Despite some of these failures of early African leaders, development
remained a central priority throughout the remainder of their political careers
and those of their successors. Although the “state-development nexus”76 altered
as growth in African economies began to decline during the period of economic
hardship in the 1970s, African states remained active participants in
development as neo-liberalism gained prominence in the 1980s.77 When the
neoliberal-inspired structural adjustment programmes failed to meet
expectations, even IFIs accepted a role for the state in the development
process.78 However, state involvement was predicated on the notion of “good
governance” advanced by those same IFIs.79
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3.4 Replicability and Rationale of the Developmental State in
Africa
The mixed history of the African state in development raised doubts about the
success of the East Asian developmental state model in the post-adjustment
era. Some scholars argued that the developmental state was economically
and culturally unique to East Asia, and beyond the political and institutional
capacity of African governments.80 Mkandawire categorises these “impossibility
theses” as: lack of ideology; dependence syndrome; lack of autonomy; neo-
patrimonialism and rent seeking; the lack of technical and analytical capacity;
and a poor record of performance.81
 
Mkandawire dismisses these arguments by arguing that they are not based
on African historical experiences, nor on the development trajectories of
successful developmental states.82 According to Mkandawire, the climate exists
in Africa for the developmental state. He contends that developmentalism
has historically been a priority for African leaders, thus refuting the lack of
ideology argument. He also dismisses the neo-patrimonial and rent seeking
arguments based on historical evidence. Neo-patrimonialsim and rent seeking
are automatically equated with corruption and patron-clientelism, without
determining whether such behaviour is advancing developmental goals or
not.83
 
 Mkandawire notes that both neo-patrimonial and rent seeking
behaviour can positively impact growth through the redistribution of resources.
In support of his argument, Mkandawire asserts corruption in high-performing
East Asian developmental states was common, and did not deter
industrialisation.84
 
Despite the replicability debate, there is greater consensus in
developmental state literature regarding the role it can play in promoting
development in modern Africa. During the colonial period, African resources
were misallocated as colonial institutions were extractive and restricted
production. Many of these colonial institutions remained intact after
independence was secured.85 In addition to inheriting extractive colonial
institutions, newly independent African states were left without a civil service,
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Mining Agreements in Africa: Recent Developments from Ghana” (2015) 16
Journal of World Investment & Trade, 467, 473.
91 ibid 474.
a strong-centralised taxation system, or vital infrastructure.86
 
 The state
structure at that time was ill equipped to meet the development objectives of
newly independent states.87
 
 Over fifty years of independence have not changed
the state structures in many African states that struggled to build state institutions
amidst war, civil strife, and the lack of adequate resources.
Across the region today the state structure remains poor. Howard Stein
describes this as a “developmental crisis” – African economies are incapable
of generating the conditions necessary for sustained levels of growth and
improvements in the standard of living.88
 
 Poverty, unemployment, and
inequality rates remain high while several states are mired in conflict, disease,
famine, and low levels of agricultural and industrial production, despite the
abundant natural resources and human capacity that a developmental state
can harness to promote meaningful economic development.89
 
4.  NEW DIRECTIONS IN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENTALISM
The varied involvement of African states in natural resource extraction has
led many commentators to speculate on how state involvement should be
framed. My purpose in this section is to consider how recent legal reforms in
the extractive sector fit into the developmental state frame- work. More
significantly, these reforms are contributing to an emerging developmental
state that mirrors the “new developmental state” and is unique to resource-
rich states, as governments in these nations are “intervening more forcefully
in the sector”.90 Of the forms of state intervention discussed below, two key
themes link these actions to the new developmental state framework. First,
states are intervening to accrue more revenue; the recent increase in
commodity prices gave resource-rich states the opportunity to revise fiscal
regimes and earn more revenue from natural resource extraction.91 Generating
more revenue can assist African states in directly achieving socio-economic
development goals, which is a central tenet of the developmental state. Second,
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these recent legal reforms support continued state involvement in extractive
industries through revised relationships with the private sector, thereby
enhancing the opportunity for long-term benefits that can contribute to the
growth, and evolution, of extractive industries.
To conclude the examination of the recent legal reforms in African
extractive sector, this section discusses the “good governance” and democratic
deficit critique that may limit the characterisation of a number of resource-
rich African states as developmental states.
4.1 Enhancing Local Participation
To maximise the benefits of foreign investment in extractive industries, many
African states introduced “indigenisation and local equity schemes”.92 Defined
broadly as “local content requirements” (LCRs), these measures typically
demand that “a certain percentage of intermediate goods used in the production
processes … be sourced from domestic manufacturers.”93 LCRs can take many
forms, including:
… mandating foreign firms to give preferences to local suppliers
in the procurement of goods and services, preferences to local
labour in matters of employment and preferences to (or mandatory
minimum percentages in) the use of local raw materials in
production. They may also take the form of “price preferences” to
domestic firms that participate in government procurement bids,
“import licensing procedures designed to discourage foreign
suppliers, and discretionary guidelines that both encourage
domestic firms and discourage foreign firms.”94
There are a number of reasons for resource-rich countries to adopt LCRs.
Chilenye Nwapi contends that:
92 ibid 480.
93 Sherry M. Stephenson, “Addressing Local Content Requirements: Current
Challenges and Future Opportunities” (2013) 7:3 BIORES, available at
<www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/biores/news/addressing-local-content-
requirements-current-challenges-and-future > accessed 15 November 2015.
94 Cathleen Cimino, Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jeffrey J. Schott, A Proposed Code to
Discipline Local Content Requirements (Peterson Institute for International
Economics Policy Brief No PB14-6, February 2014) 1, <www.iie.com/
publications/pb/pb14-6.pdf> quoted in Chilenye Nwapi, “Defining the ‘Local’
in Local Content Requirements in the Oil and Gas and Mining Sectors in
Developing Countries” (2015) 8:1 Law and Development Review, 187, 191.
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They are undertaken to reduce inequalities faced by domestic
companies in relation to foreign companies, increase the
participation of the national industry in specific sectors of economic
activity, improve national technological development, create job
opportunities for nationals to improve their personal income,
support economic diversification, promote intersectoral linkages
and reduce overdependence on one sector by enhancing the value-
creating capacity of a particular sector, and to enable domestic
companies to compete regionally and internationally.95
In resource-rich Africa, specific LCRs undertaken range from local
employment quotas to the preferential treatment of companies with higher
levels of local procurement. The following examples highlight some of these
local participation measures:
• Burkina Faso introduced detailed obligations in its mining sector
outlining that preference should be given to local businesses in the
procurement of goods and services; local employees should be hired
to fill senior executive positions, which include a training
programme to ensure the progressive replacement of foreign staff
in senior positions; and that local labour be employed in low-skilled
jobs.96
• Guinea’s 2011 Mining Code introduced the requirement that
feasibility studies submitted for mining concessions and permits
“must include a plan of support for building or strengthening the
capacity of local small and medium enterprises, or enterprises
belonging to, or controlled by Guineans for supplying goods and
services for their activities and a plan of promotion of employment
of Guineans according to the quotas established by the code.”97
• Similarly, Angola and Nigeria implemented local content strategies
in their oil and gas sectors that emphasise indigenous labour, and
95 Chilenye Nwapi, “Defining the ‘Local’ in Local Content Requirements in the Oil
and Gas and Mining Sectors in Developing Countries” (2015) 8:1 Law and
Development Review, 187, 191.
96 Stéphanie Brabant, “Current Trends in Mining Law and Regulation in West
Africa” (MineAfrica 4th Annual Focus on West Africa Seminar, London, October
2014) 41.
97 Ana Elizabeth Bastida, “From Extractive to Transformative Industries: Paths for
Linkages and Diversification for Resource-Driven Development” (2014) 27 (2-
3) Mineral Economics. 73, 77.
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Challenging the Enclave Thesis” (2012) 37 Resources Policy 434, 437.
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preferential treatment of local companies for the procurement of
goods and services.98
• In Botswana, the government implemented local participation
strategies that aim to sustain greater linkages to downstream
diamond industries, including cutting and polishing, and jewellery
manufacturing. The creation of the Botswana Diamond Hub, and
securing the sales agreement with De Beers that moved the company’s
rough diamond sales division to Gaborone, are two measures aimed
at increasing local participation.99
• Ghana’s Minerals and Mining Act (2006) promotes local
participation by reserving small-scale mining for Ghanaian citizens;
requiring gold mining companies to give preferential treatment to
locally made products, and the recruitment of local labour, which
includes the creation of a mandatory training programme designed
to ensure the progressive replacement of foreign staff by local
personnel.100
4.2 Developing Linkages
The Africa Mining Vision identified harnessing linkages as a key area of
improvement for extractive sectors.101 Since mineral endowments are finite
and prone to price volatility, integrating the industry into other areas of the
national economy can provide long-term benefits to resource-rich countries.102
Integration can occur by developing a number of relationships between the
extractive sector and other industrial sectors. Possible “linkages” include
upstream linkages, downstream linkages, and side stream linkages.103
Broadly speaking, upstream (or backward) linkages are the relationships
between an industry and its suppliers. In the extractive sector, upstream linkages
arise early in the production process “as deposits are identified, assayed and
quantified; finance secured; legal and permitting issues addressed; plans for
development and earthworks commissioned; and labour, raw materials
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equipment and utilities sourced.”104 Alternatively, downstream linkages (also
referred to as forward linkages) connect extracted resources to value-added
production processes: smelting or refining, semi-fabrication, or final product
manufacturing.105 Side stream linkages are created when the extractives
industry helps build other industries, such as “financial services, power,
logistics, communications, skills and technology development”.106
Many African states reversed their positions on having investors support
linkage development from the 1980s when it was thought this requirement
could deter foreign investment.107 Today, supplementary investments that
support linkage creation are widespread. Many are infrastructure focused,
and require certain investments in transportation networks and power grids.108
Such measures have been undertaken in Angola, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Gabon, Liberia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.109
4.3 Broader “Resource Nationalism”110
In addition to state efforts to increase local participation and strengthen
sectoral linkages, African states are inserting themselves in the extractives
industry by increasing state interests in extractive projects, reviewing and
renegotiating contracts with foreign investors, and reforming fiscal regimes
to ensure a greater share of resource revenue.
After the neo-liberal structural adjustment in the 1980s and 1990s did
not yield the success African states were expecting, many are now asserting
greater roles either directly or indirectly through state-owned enterprises.
Through state participation, African states can directly share in the financial
rewards available from extractive sectors, rather than being a passive collector
of tax revenue.111 State participation offers a number of benefits to African
104 ibid 103.
105 Bastida (n 97) 74; UNECA/AU (n 9) 104.
106 Bastida (n 97) 74; UNECA/AU (n 9) 106.
107 UNECA/AU (n 9) 107.
108 Besada and Martin, “Mining Codes in Africa” (2015) (n 1) 276.
109 ibid.
110 The characterisation of tightening regulation in the extractives industry as
“resource nationalism” is problematic for some scholars. Martin Kwaku Ayisi
provides a brief overview of this debate in his article, “The Review of Mining
Laws and the Renegotiation of Mining Agreements in Africa: Recent
Developments from Ghana” (n 100), and concludes that the label “can only
obstruct a better understanding of why and how contemporary governments
are intervening more forcefully in the sector” (473).
111 MA Ayoade, “Nigerian Petroleum Profits Tax and Financial Incentives: 50-Year
Requiem?” (2008-2010) 24 UGLJ 171, 173.
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oil-producers; of particular relevance to the fiscal regime is the ability to
potentially increase government revenues beyond what the regime normally
provides.112 There are various versions of state participation, including equity
participation (where government acquires a stake in production), service
agreements and production sharing agreements.113
Several African states introduced recent changes to their participatory
regimes that increased the level of equity participation, installed minimum
levels of equity participation, and stipulated that additional levels of
participation are at the discretion of the state.114 Some mining examples
include:
• Côte d’Ivoire, which requires 10 per cent state participation for
zero dollars, and up to an additional 15 per cent (unless the state is
involved in exploration);115
• Guinea, where the state is empowered to acquire interest in a project
“on a fully paid basis up to a maximum shareholding of 35 per
cent,”116 which is in addition to the 15 per cent equity participation
available for free upon the issuance of a mining licence for bauxite,
iron ore, uranium, gold, and diamond deposits;117
• Mali and Mauritania, which require 10 per cent free participation,
and an additional negotiated 10 per cent participation;118 and
• Togo, where 10 per cent free participation is mandatory, and an
additional 20 per cent can be negotiated.119
A number of contract reviews and renegotiations were aimed at amending
stabilisation clauses. Stabilisation clauses are either contractual or statutory
obligations that aim to “freeze” the law of the host country to the date the
112 World Bank, Taxation and State Participation in Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Sector
(August 2004) 41 <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2004/08/
5539607/taxation-state-participation-nigerias-oil-gas-sector> accessed 26
October 2015.
113 Evaristus Oshionebo, “Fiscal Regimes for Natural Resource Extraction:
Implications for Africa’s Development” in Francis Botchway (ed), Natural
Resource Investment and Africa’s Development (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011)
200.
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national government enters into an agreement with an extractives company.120
The effect is to insulate the corporation from future changes to the host country’s
laws, which could potentially harm its investment. The reviews that took
place in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, and Ghana are examples of
amendments made to shorten the length of the clause.
Lastly, several states increased royalty rates, and other fiscal measures
such as corporate tax rates, to ensure higher levels of resource revenue.121
Examples include Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Guinea.122
4.4 Good Governance and Democracy Concerns
The contact between natural resources and African governments has generally
been characterised as problematic. Critics of the handling of African resource
wealth used the “resource curse” thesis to explain Africa’s mismanagement of
the sector.123 The thesis contends that natural resource endowment is more of
a curse than a blessing to resource abundant countries, in contrast to resource
poor states.124 Although the thesis was originally developed to explain slow
economic growth, it evolved to capture two other phenomena: weak political
institutions, and a higher prevalence of civil conflicts.125 Both were linked to
the rent-seeking and corrupt behaviour of political elites.126 Despite resource
wealth credited as the cause of political violence in places like the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone,127 there is no consensus about the
correlation between the two.128
The detrimental impact of natural resource wealth on African political
processes was of particular concern to IFIs. In particular, the “governance
matters” mantra that began in the late 1980s and continued into the 1990s
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University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 2012) 287.
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ushered in a new era of focus on African institutions. Since the emergence of
the “good governance” agenda, it became easier to contend that “the lack of
democratic accountability and the presence of patron-client politics, extensive
corruption, and a weak rule of law”129 contributed to the poor management
of natural resources in Africa.
The contemporary intervention of African states in extractive industries
is raising concerns for those who subscribe to the “governance matters”
mantra.130 Any absence or lack of democratic institutions, such as multi-party
elections, the rule of law, transparency, accountability, and presidential term
limits tends to overshadow the potential success of African state intervention
in extractive industries.131 Despite previous recommendations made in reports
issued by IFI (including the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review) to
limit state involvement, it is unlikely those past concerns will limit state
action today. Instead, it begs the question of whether contemporary forms of
intervention, as manifested in the emerging resource developmental state
framework, can respond to good governance concerns.
5.  CONCLUSION
As African states expressed in the Africa Mining Vision, natural resource
extraction presents a unique opportunity to advance socio-economic
development by “integrating the sector more coherently and firmly into the
continent’s economy and society.”132 Recent policies introduced by African
governments are indicative of this emerging resource-rich developmental state
– governments are seeking ways to garner greater benefits from extractive
industries through direct state intervention and revised relationships with the
private sector by enhancing local participation, developing linkages between
the extractive sector and the broader economy, and implementing broader
resource nationalist reforms that include contract reviews, revised fiscal regimes
to ensure a greater share of resource revenue, and increased levels of equity
participation in extractive projects.
129 Mushtaq H Khan, “Governance and Growth Challenges in Africa” in Akbar
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and Governance in Africa: Rethinking Development Strategies (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011) 115.
130 Botchway and Moudud, “The Search” (n 50) 16.
131 ibid 35.
132 UNECA/AU (n 9) 9.
24 AFE BABALOLA UNIVERSITY:  J. OF SUST. DEV. LAW & POLICY VOL. 7: 1: 2016
While several African governments are making these strides towards a
resource-rich developmental state, the concept is yet to fully form across
much of the region as it is unclear how this emerging state model can achieve
the “transparent, equitable and optimal exploitation of mineral resources”133
that avoids the lack of accountability, presence of patron-client politics,
extensive corruption, and weak rule of law so characteristic of African resource
extraction.134 As Thandika Mkandawire warns,
we should avoid an idealised view of the developmental state as
omnipotent and omniscient… In many ways, the discovery of the
developmental state has tended to produce its own mystification
of a non-corrupt, dedicated, omniscient bureaucracy that selflessly
and patriotically manages economic transformation of its society.135
Thus, the emerging developmental state alone is likely not the panacea
for reversing the paradox of plenty that contributes to Africa’s developmental
crises. It is likely a combination of governance and development-oriented
legal and fiscal frameworks that can advance the “broad-based sustainable
growth and socio-economic development” envisaged by the AMV.136 As Bonnie
Campbell has noted, “while the quality of national governance is undoubtedly
a key ingredient, no amount of … governance is sufficient if not accompanied
by legal and fiscal frameworks designed to meet development objectives…”137
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